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INTRODUCTION
In January 1998 the circumstances of a young man’s death in
Kumbungu, Ghana, were seen as unnatural,1 and an act of “bewitch-
ment was invoked to explain [his] death.” 2 “Three days later, about
eight masked vigilantes ‘avenged’ his death by bludgeoning and
stoning to death two women, aged 55 and 60 years old, on suspicion
that the pair were witches and had caused the man’s death by super-
natural means.” 3 
1. Mensah Adinkrah, Witchcraft Accusations and Female Homicide Victimization in
Contemporary Ghana, 10 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 325, 343 (2004) (“In Ghana, as in
many modernizing societies, there is a common perception that death is unnatural unless
the deceased was aged.”).
2. Id.
3. Id.
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Unfortunately, this same witchcraft belief system runs across
most of sub-Saharan Africa, such that “ ‘every evil and misfortune that
is incapable of rational explanation is attributed to witchcraft.’ ” 4
Most individuals branded and victimized as witches are women, 5
especially older women and widows.6 Furthermore, while believers
in witchcraft within sub-Saharan Africa do accept the fact that a
person has died of a certain illness, be it malaria or heart disease,
“which explains how the misfortune happened[,]—these cultures
[still] seek a metaphysical answer for why it occurred.” 7
This Note seeks to provide insight into the concept of witchcraft
and its legal implications for women, particularly older women, in
contemporary sub-Saharan Africa. Part I explores the foundation
for the belief in witchcraft and witchcraft’s place in and effect on the
social ordering within communities in sub-Saharan Africa. Part II
examines the clash of customary/traditional laws against state legal
systems, mostly common and civil law traditions. Witchcraft histori-
cally fell under the jurisdiction of customary/traditional legal systems,8
and, today, accused witches in sub-Saharan Africa have no specific
legal or human rights protections under most state constitutions.9 And
because there is not one universal law within sub-Saharan Africa
against witch hunts,10 this Note will evaluate whether any specific
4. Mohammed A. Diwan, Note, Conflict between State Legal Norms and Norms
Underlying Popular Beliefs: Witchcraft in Africa as a Case Study, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L
L. 351, 355 (2004) (quoting ONESMUS K. MUTUNGI, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF WITCHCRAFT
IN EAST AFRICA WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO KENYA xvii (1977)).
5. Robert A. LeVine, Witchcraft and Sorcery in a Gusii Community, in WITCHCRAFT
AND SORCERY IN EAST AFRICA 221, 225 (John Middleton & E.H. Winter eds., 1963).
6. Johann Hari, Witch Hunt: Africa’s Hidden War on Women, THE INDEPENDENT,
Mar. 12, 2009, http://independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/witch-hunt-africas-hidden-war
-on-women-1642907.html.
7. Hallie Ludsin, Cultural Denial: What South Africa’s Treatment of Witchcraft Says
for the Future of Its Customary Law, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 62, 74 (2003) (citing ISAK
ARNOLD NIEHAUS, WITCHCRAFT, POWER AND POLITICS: AN ETHNOGRAPHIC STUDY OF THE
SOUTH AFRICAN LOWVELD 17 (1997) (unpublished dissertation) (on file with the University
of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg library)).
8. See id. at 83 (describing how traditional courts punished witchcraft, mediated
conflicts involving accusations of witchcraft, and even provided remedies, including
compensation for individuals falsely accused of witchcraft).
9. Although the constitutions of some sub-Saharan countries such as Ghana and
South Africa offer general human rights protections, there are no specific provisions that
address witchcraft. E.g., GHANA CONST. ch. 5, art. 26(2) (1992) (prohibiting dehumanizing
or injurious customary practices but failing to mention witchcraft); S. AFR. CONST. 1996.
South Africa does, however, have domestic legislation to prevent false accusations of witch-
craft, which will be discussed infra, in Part II.D.
10. Although there is already legislation in countries like Cameroon, the Central
African Republic, and Gabon that prohibit the practice of witchcraft, such universal
legislation would be difficult because “[s]orcery in Africa is not a uniform belief[;] . . . it
cannot always be put into one box.” Rights: Child Witchcraft Allegations on the Rise,
IRIN NEWS (July 16, 2010), http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?Reportid=89858.
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State action is enough to protect these women, or whether specific
rights are being violated under state laws. Part III follows with an
analysis of various international treaties, principles, and norms and
explores international law and human rights standards that could
or should arguably protect this victimized class of women in contem-
porary sub-Saharan Africa.
In Part IV, the Note concludes by brainstorming suggestions
and potential methods to handle situations involving witchcraft accu-
sations. This is crucial, as the notion of witchcraft, as a basis of
discussion, is one of many traditional belief systems, yet is one that
adversely affect women within contemporary sub-Saharan Africa,
and which lacks clear legal remedies.11 These methods include utiliz-
ing the perspective of traditional laws, national legal systems, or a
combination of both. Additionally, Part IV will focus on the different
roles the international community can play in assisting these mar-
ginalized women. This Note concludes by analyzing whether an inter-
national solution, rather than a domestic grassroots approach, is the
more efficient method of protecting women without simultaneously
destroying the current integrated, customary/traditional, and state
legal systems of contemporary sub-Saharan Africa.
I. BACKGROUND: WITCHCRAFT AND SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
A. Definition of “Witch” and “Witchcraft”
Certain ideas, such as evil spirits, sorcery, spell casting, magic,
and harmful curses, are all synonymous with the idea of witches or
witchcraft.12 A witch can be described as “a person with an incorrigi-
ble, conscious tendency to kill or disable others by magical means,”13
or as someone “who secretly uses supernatural power for nefarious
purposes.”14
Because of the varying beliefs and practices among the different
communities within sub-Saharan Africa, the definition of a witch or
witchcraft is not singular.15 Instead, because “[w]itchcraft is a vague
11. See HELPAGE INT’L, Discrimination against Older Women in Burkina Faso, 6
(2010), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/ngos/JointNGO
Report_BurkinaFaso47.pdf (“Customary laws perpetuating inequality and human rights
violations and the absence of clear legal and policy frameworks lead to the State’s inability
to enforce legislation such as the family and penal codes.”).
12. Ludsin, supra note 7, at 76.
13. LeVine, supra note 5, at 225.
14. Nelson Tebbe, Witchcraft and Statecraft: Liberal Democracy in Africa, 96 GEO.
L.J. 183, 190 (2007).
15. Id.
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and loose term defying exact definition,”16 “[e]ven within a single
community, beliefs [about witchcraft] are not typically organized
into a coherent system.”17 In spite of this wide range of viewpoints,
the concept of witchcraft typically does universally encompass “ ‘the
power to inflict injury and benefit . . . through unobservable, super-
natural means.’ ”18
One of the fundamental beliefs that many ethnic groups and
populations within sub-Saharan Africa share is the belief that “witch-
craft is not a faith that people openly profess”19 to practice; rather,
the issue only arises through others’ “accusation or suspicion.” 20
Secondly, witchcraft is viewed as a human, not divine, action,21 one
that results from supernatural happenings such as a pact with the
devil,22 or through other motivations, such as jealousy, hatred, or
revenge.23 In addition, witches are often accused of attacking neigh-
bors and intimates in order to further their own selfish interests or
“out of an inherent craving for causing harm.” 24
B. Witchcraft Accusations
Under common understandings of witchcraft in sub-Saharan
Africa, accused witches may be of any age or either sex, but women
are certainly the most common targets of witchcraft accusations.25
For example, among the Gusii people of south-eastern Kenya, “[a]
witch can be of either sex, but is much more likely to be a woman.”26
This imbalance reflects the belief that witchcraft “is an acquired
art . . . handed down from parent to child.” 27 Even though sons can
learn witchcraft,28 daughters are believed to inherit their mothers’
witch powers.29 According to the Lovendu people of South Africa,
16. Jemma Neville, No Country For Old Women: In Medieval Europe They Drowned
Suspected Witches. In South-East Africa Today, the Killers Use Machetes, THE GUARDIAN,
Nov. 22, 2008, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/journalismcompetition/old-women.
17. Tebbe, supra note 14, at 190.
18. Diwan, supra note 4, at 355 (quoting JENNIFER WINDER, BUILDING THE RULE OF
LAW 380 (2000)).
19. Tebbe, supra note 14, at 190.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 191.
22. Diwan, supra note 4, at 355.
23. Tebbe, supra note 14, at 191.
24. Id. at 191-92.
25. LeVine, supra note 5, at 225; Ludsin, supra note 7, at 80.
26. LeVine, supra note 5, at 225.
27. Id. at 228.
28. Id. Sons are less likely to accept their mothers’ witch training and can “avoid
becoming [a witch] by having as little contact as possible with [their] mother[s].” Id.
29. Ludsin, supra note 7, at 80.
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these powers are inherited when “children drink in witchcraft with
their mother’s milk.” 30 As for the mother,
she will try to train her children in witchcraft, at first by sending
them to procure the exuviae of prospective victims. The daughters
of a witch are considered more likely to accept this training be-
cause girls are more obedient than boys and also because they
spend more tmie [sic] with their mothers.31
Also, among the Akans in Ghana, the belief that most witches
are female can be attributed to the fact that women “are considered
the weaker sex and [so are] more susceptible to be[ing] ‘carriers of
witchcraft.’ ” 32 Furthermore, persons who “learn witchcraft in adult-
hood from someone other than their parents are typically married
women,” who are educated by their mothers-in-law.33 Interestingly,
these same “women are more likely to be targets of accusations be-
cause of what is considered the typically poor and often jealous rela-
tionship between mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law,” who may
spitefully accuse each other of witchcraft as part of competition for
the son/husband figure.34
Often, those typically thought to be witches are middle-aged or
elderly individuals, particularly those who are in poor health.35 Of
these, elderly women are said to be more susceptible to accusations
because of their particular physical features, such as drooping breasts,
eyes that are yellow or red, wrinkled skin, missing teeth, and a
hunched stance.36 People who exhibit anti-social, difficult, or other-
wise odd behavior are also likely targets of witchcraft accusations.37
Additionally, as a result of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in sub-Saha-
ran Africa, many women have outlived their children.38 With the loss
of the “so-called ghost generation of HIV/Aids,”39 these older women
are left to care for their orphaned grandchildren.40 Yet these grand-
mothers are increasingly viewed with suspicion by the community,41
30. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
31. LeVine, supra note 5, at 228.
32. Adinkrah, supra note 1, at 335.
33. LeVine, supra note 5, at 229.
34. Ludsin, supra note 7, at 80.
35. Adinkrah, supra note 1, at 336.
36. Id.
37. Ludsin, supra note 7, at 81. Living alone is deemed a form of anti-social behavior,
which may explain why older women are the primary targets of witchcraft accusations. Id.
38. Neville, supra note 16.
39. Id.
40. Id. (“Unicef estimates that 14% of all children in Tanzania are orphans, of whom
64% are cared for by grandparents.”).
41. Id.
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which makes them even more “vulnerable targets with which to
attribute blame for unforeseen problems.”42
C. How an Accusation of Witchcraft Operates
In sub-Saharan Africa, some of the common notions about
witchcraft are “that witches are nocturnal, traveling secretly, as
balls of fire, at night to remote locations where they cavort with
other witches and feast on unsuspecting relatives, causing physical
and psychological harm.” 43 In addition to being thought to operate
in groups, witches are also believed to carry out all of their evil deeds
while in spirit form, during which time their physical bodies are
still sleeping.44
Witches are described as deriving their powers either through
inheritance or by learning them from others.45 They are also believed
to use these powers to “cast spells, curse individuals, or use charms
or medicines, all of which ultimately cause harm.” 46 Through super-
natural powers, a witch, can, for example, manipulate evil spirits,
enter someone’s body, and force the individual to suffer symptoms of
a certain disease. According to traditional African beliefs, “[w]itches
can [also] use animals and lightning bolts to create accidents and in-
juries.”47 Throughout sub-Saharan Africa, ailments such as infertility
in women, the destruction of crops and property, accidents, sickness,
and even death can be attributed to acts of witchcraft.48
No one ever admits to being a witch; witchcraft accusations “are
based on mere suspicion, rumor, or gossip” that circulates within
the community.49 For example, in South Africa, when misfortunes
are experienced, traditional healers and diviners are often sought
to determine and explain whether the source of the misfortune was
witchcraft.50 The belief is that diviners can smell out a witch because
“witches carry a terrible smell that diviners can detect.” 51
Along this same line, in Ghana, when individuals believe they
may have been bewitched, they “may consult an oracle or witch
42. Id.
43. Adinkrah, supra note 1, at 335.
44. Id.
45. Ludsin, supra note 7, at 76 (citations omitted).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 76-77 (citation omitted).
48. Id. at 76.
49. Adinkrah, supra note 1, at 337.
50. Ludsin, supra note 7, at 78. Some fear they may have upset their ancestors, while
others believe their misfortunes have resulted from witchcraft. Id.
51. Id. at 79 (citing FREDERICK KAIGH, WITHCHCRAFT AND MAGIC OF AFRICA 40 (1947)).
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doctor, who, through divination, may establish, confirm or reveal the
identity of the offending witch.” 52 In many communities within sub-
Saharan Africa, “after a witchcraft accusation is leveled, the suspected
witch is threatened, drugged, beaten, forced to submit to humiliating
ordeals, or is coerced into confessing” to her supposed evil powers.53
In extreme cases, accused witches are even butchered to death be-
cause of an allegation of witchcraft.54
D. Statistics of Witchcraft Accusations in Sub-Saharan Africa
The ordeal of Sato Magdalena Ndela, a shrunken, elderly woman
from Kenya, is particularly poignant.55 Sato cannot remember when
she was called a witch for the first time, but she vividly recalls an
attack in 1995 that has forever left her scarred.56 As told to a reporter,
It happened in the night. I heard people opening the door without
knocking . . . . They shone a light in my face. I thought—what is
happening? What can I do? That was when I felt the first cut
into my body. I looked down and saw my hand was cut right off.
Then they cut into the right one and it was hanging. Then I felt
a blow against my head and I lost consciousness.57
Sato’s story is just one of many.58 The statistics regarding witch-
craft accusations leveled against women in sub-Saharan Africa are
grave. HelpAge International estimates that around 1,000 witchcraft-
related killings occur in Tanzania each year, and the victims are
mostly older women.59 In March 2009, Amnesty International reported
that as many as 300 people in Sintet village in The Gambia were
kidnaped from their homes by “witch doctors” and placed in deten-
tion centers, where they were “forced to drink hallucinogenic concoc-
tions” as part of a witch-hunting campaign.60 The report also indicates
52. Adinkrah, supra note 1, at 337.
53. Id.
54. Hari, supra note 6.
55. Id.
56. Id. Sato’s “head is one long scar, and her ear is a twisted lump. Ever since the
attack in 1995, her right eye has been weeping salt tears and pus. . . . Now [she] can’t
do anything.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. Id.
58. Neville, supra note 16 (“Villages along the shores of Lake Victoria have en-
countered escalating numbers of murders: mostly older women, who have been accused
of witchcraft.”).
59. Id.
60. The Gambia: Hundreds Accused of “Witchcraft” and Poisoned in Government
Campaign, AMNESTY INT’L (Mar. 18, 2009), http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press
-releases/gambia-hundreds-accused-%E2%80%9Cwitchcraft%E2%80%9D-and-poisoned
-government-campaign-20.
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that at least two people forced to drink the concoction died from
kidney failure.61
Another report has revealed that in Northern Ghana, 5,000 to
8,000 accused witches have been banished from their homes and
forced to live in shelters, where they endure “physically dehumaniz-
ing conditions.” 62 Many fear returning to their families for fear of
community reprisal.63 Across sub-Saharan Africa, similar situations
involving witchcraft accusations have been reported in countries such
as Cameroon, Botswana, Nigeria, and Mozambique, to name a few.64
E. Witchcraft and Its Effects on the Social Ordering Of
Communities Within Sub-Saharan Africa
The belief in witchcraft throughout sub-Saharan Africa cuts
across all social lines.65 It is a belief held by traditional and religious
groups66 as well as by urban and rural populations.67 For example,
even though many educated individuals within sub-Saharan Africa
may “not believe that witches have all the powers traditionally
ascribed to them,” they nevertheless believe in the notion of witch-
craft and that witches do exist.68
Some may argue that allegations of witchcraft and the subse-
quent punishment of suspected witches serve a social purpose.69 The
reasons cited include the notion that “witchcraft accusations bring
tensions within the community into the open . . . often allowing for
a traditional leader to mediate conflicts.” 70 It is also argued that the
threat of witchcraft accusations “curb antisocial behavior” and pro-
vide an incentive for people “to treat each other well.” 71 Even though
these may be legitimate arguments, witchcraft accusations not only
61. Id.
62. Adinkrah, supra note 1, at 328.
63. Id.
64. Aleksandra Cimpric, Children Accused of Witchcraft: An Anthropological Study
of Contemporary Practices in Africa, U.N. CHILDREN’S FUND, 12 (2010), available at
http://www.unicef.org/wcaro/wcaro_children-accused-of-witchcraft-in-Africa.pdf.
65. See id. at 9 (“Contrary to a number of hypotheses . . . that were quick to predict
the decline or disappearance of . . . superstitious beliefs as a result of the rise of economic
development, urbanization, [and] education . . . witchcraft belief has not disappeared. It
is apparent as an unquestionable component of private and public life.”).
66. See id. at 37 (noting that in these communities, individuals look to both traditional
healers and religious pastors to heal “ ‘witchcraft-related’ illnesses”).
67. Id. at 9 (“[W]itchcraft is no longer a village affair.”).
68. LeVine, supra note 5, at 229.
69. Ludsin, supra note 7, at 82.
70. Id. (citation omitted).
71. Id.
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discriminate against women in sub-Saharan Africa, they also have
the effect of disenfranchising women within their communities. Not
only are accused women victimized by communal notions of witch-
craft, they are also treated as second-class citizens and face a myriad
of social problems within their communities as a result.72
Among those subjected to witchcraft accusations, most are elderly
and, almost always, widowed women with no personal income, and
so are dependent on others for their well being.73 Therefore, “[i]n
addition to facing physical abandonment and physical abuse, women
accused of being witches are often materially and financially neglected
by kin. The consequences of financial neglect are grave.”74 In addition,
not only will an accused lose honor and respect within her commu-
nity, this stigmatization may also lead to major emotional distress
and mental anguish.75
Witchcraft accusations levied against old women may also have
severe social and economic impacts on the crucial role of grandmothers
within the community. Socially, older women in African communi-
ties are viewed as a strong “learning institution” for the younger
generation.76 Thus, if these women are marginalized within their
communities, there may be no one to inspire the younger generations.
Another issue that arises with respect to the importance of grand-
mothers is based on an economic concern: who, besides grandmothers,
will look after the orphaned children of sub-Saharan Africa now that
the continent is losing a generation of parents to HIV/AIDS?77
II. THE “MULTI-FACETED” LEGAL STRUCTURE IN
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Though today “ ‘[l]aw’ in Africa is a multi-faceted concept,” this
was not always the case.78 Before its colonization, the foundation of
sub-Saharan Africa’s legal structure embodied a well-developed cus-
tomary law that governed the indigenous tribal and ethnic populations
72. See Adinkrah, supra note 1, at 338 (noting that women accused of witchcraft lose
their status in the community and their honor with their relatives).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Judi Aubel, Grandmothers: A Learning Institution, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV.,
1 (2005), available at http://www.beps.net/publications/GrandmothersFINALTAG.pdf.
77. AMY S. PATTERSON, THE AFRICAN STATE AND THE AIDS CRISIS 5 (2005) (“11
million African children under 15 years old . . . have lost at least one parent to AIDS.”);
Neville, supra note 16.
78. FAREDA BANDA, WOMEN, LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 13
(2005).
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“for whom custom was law.” 79 Though colonialism was somewhat
short-lived in many African countries, “[t]he significance of this brief
colonial history is that one of the results of the new political dispen-
sation was the imposition of a new legal system on the colonized coun-
try,” one that superseded the customary law.80
Still, “[t]here were of course regional variations [based on] differ-
ences in the approaches of the different colonisers.” 81 For example,
in most former British sub-Saharan colonies, the legal system reflects
the English common law system, whereas most former French colonies
follow the civil law system.82 Some countries in Southern Africa even
adopted, and continue to follow, the Roman-Dutch legal structure.83
Colonial independence in Africa brought about its own challenges,
especially with regard to choice of law.84 Whereas certain aspects of
customary law assimilated with the imposed European legal struc-
tures,85 a “romanticised notion of restoring [true] ‘customary law’ and
‘African culture’ to” independent Africa also created a legal enigma
with respect to the role customary beliefs should play in law.86 One
such customary belief is the notion of witchcraft,87 coupled with the
traditional perceptions and legal implications of one being an accused
witch. So, “punishing individuals who kill alleged witches creates a
conflict between state legal norms and norms underlying popular be-
liefs” because, culturally, the act of killing a witch is often praised.88
Due to this conflict, most African states have “stop[ped] short of
criminalizing popular beliefs in witchcraft,” despite the fact that
they “generally do not see witchcraft as legitimate.” 89
A. History of Legal Systems Within Sub-Saharan Africa
“In traditional African societies, custom [was] the principal, if
not the only, source of law.” 90 “Customary” or “traditional” law can
79. Julie A. Davies & Dominic N. Dagbanja, The Role and Future of Customary Tort
Law in Ghana: A Cross-cultural Perspective, 26 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 303, 303, 305
(2009).
80. See BANDA, supra note 78, at 15.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 13, 19.
85. See Davies & Dagbanja, supra note 79, at 305-06 (describing the integration of the
received common law with the customary law in Anglophonic African countries).
86. BANDA, supra note 78, at 19.
87. Hence, “[i]n Africa, norms underlying beliefs in witchcraft pose a significant chal-
lenge to state legal norms underlying the new postcolonial normative orientation towards
modernization.” Diwan, supra note 4, at 358.
88. Id. at 354.
89. Id. at 352.
90. Justice Mobido Ocran, The Clash of Legal Cultures: The Treatment of Indigenous
Law in Colonial and Post-Colonial Africa, 39 AKRON L. REV. 465, 467 (2006).
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be described as “a set of established norms, practices, and usages
derived from the lives of people,” 91 and it has thrived in sub-Saharan
Africa since the region was first populated.92 “The source of [customary
law’s] legal validity is the cultural expression of the particular soci-
ety where it is practiced.” 93 Customary law incorporates the “influ-
ential morals and religious beliefs of the people” 94 and “govern[s]
topics such as family law and social relations.” 95
Because customary law is comprised of the rules of customs and
beliefs of a particular group or community, it “is non-specialized [in]
that it does not distinguish between varying areas of law.” 96 For
example, customary law is known to “blur[ ] the lines between civil
and criminal law.” 97 Perhaps because it is often unwritten,98 custom-
ary law is thought of as “living” entity that is “dynamic, adaptable,
flexible and practical.” 99 Yet, although “devoid of rigidity,”100 cus-
tomary law is also used to impose and maintain social order and
harmony in the community.101 This may be explained, in part, by the
fact that customary law raises the collective interests of the com-
munity above individuals’ personal rights.102
Traditional leaders have long played an instrumental role in
customary law. For instance, in some pre-colonial African societies,
the procedure for determining whether someone was a witch started
with an alleged victim approaching a traditional leader with a com-
plaint of having suffered some harm as a result of witchcraft.103 The
traditional leader then looked into the allegation to determine whether
it was legitimate or whether it instead involved another underlying
issue.104 If the accused was believed to have used witchcraft, the indi-
vidual was handed over to a “diviner” for subsequent identification as
a “witch,”105 and, if found to be a witch after a trial was conducted, the
community leader would punish the individual.106 On the other hand,
91. Davies & Dagbanja, supra note 79, at 303.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Ocran, supra note 90, at 467.
95. Davies & Dagbanja, supra note 79, at 303.
96. Ludsin, supra note 7, at 70 (citation omitted).
97. Id.
98. Ocran, supra note 90, at 467.
99. Ludsin, supra note 7, at 72 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
100. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
101. Id. at 66, 70 (noting how the focus of customary law is on helping parties reconcile
their differences, rather than on having one party win and the other lose).
102. Id. at 70.
103. Id. at 84.
104. Id.
105. Ludsin, supra note 7, at 84.
106. Id. at 85-86.
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if the leader determined that the dispute was not related to witch-
craft, he mediated the parties’ dispute to find a solution.107 There-
fore, even though this system had flaws, it also had within it certain
ascribed procedural mechanisms designed to protect against abuse.108
After colonization, although indigenous Africans were some-
times allowed to retain their personal customary laws in the private
sphere,109  “the foreign law became the general law.”110 Still, customary
law was only accepted to a certain extent:111 the particular “aspects
of African customs that European culture found most appalling, ridic-
ulous, or simply unhelpful” were declared repugnant pursuant to
“repugnancy clauses,”112 which were then incorporated into the cus-
tomary law definition.113 As such, not all customs were tolerated by
the colonial legal system, and the customary rules and traditions
not consistent with written laws were deemed invalid.114
The belief in and notion of witchcraft was one such aspect of
customary law found to be repugnant to European culture.115 In par-
ticular, “the question of proof ” of witchcraft under the customary
system was problematic for the colonial jurists.116 Apart from the
question of proving how one was a witch, another problem presented
by witchcraft accusations was how to determine the legal options
available to the victim or the victim’s family.117 For example: “[w]as
it appropriate, or legally excusable, to kill someone believed to be a
witch? More particularly, was it legally excusable to kill a witch in an
anticipatory strike, in the manner of self defense?”118 Certainly
there were no clear answers, so the colonizers sought instead to elim-
inate the notion of witchcraft within the customary-law prong of sub-
Saharan Africa’s newly developed dualist legal system through the
creation of repugnancy clauses.119 Yet because the belief in witchcraft
107. Id. at 84
108. Id.
109. BANDA, supra note 78, at 16.
110. Id. at 15.
111. Ocran, supra note 90, at 470.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 475. “The repugnancy clauses were meant to rule out laws and customs per-
ceived to be against Christian values and morality or cruel and unusual by the standards
of the colonizers.” Id. (citation omitted).
114. Id.
115. See id. at 470 (“Two things particularly baffled the British. One was the crime of
suicide, and the other was witchcraft.”).
116. Ocran, supra note 90, at 472.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 474-75 (“In the face of this clash of cultures and of legal thought, what were
the British to do in Africa? . . . The legal strategy was to introduce ‘repugnancy clauses’ into
the definition of customary law.”).
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was still prevalent within the community,120 these clauses ironically
had the effect of eliminating the procedural protections for accused
witches that were in place under customary law.
B. Sources of Law Within Contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa
“The coming of independence to African countries, from Ghana
in 1957 to South Africa in 1994, brought about its own dilemmas,”
igniting a very romanticized idea of bringing traditional law and
culture back to Africa.121 In certain aspects, a conflict-of-laws had
been created because, as with the dualist court systems of the past,122
independent sub-Saharan Africa emerged with a system that inte-
grated customary law with the State legal systems implemented
during colonization.123
Notably, “[t]he customary law invoked in post-independent
states was not the flexible, dynamic custom of pre-colonial years,
but rather the court/state/man manufactured hand-me-down of the
colonial era,”124 just with modifications of colonial repugnancy clauses
in some countries.125 In countries like Botswana, Ghana, and Sierra
Leone, for example, “[i]ncompatibility with legislative enactments or
of decisions of the highest court of the land became the main criteria
for” determining whether customary law was viewed as unacceptable
or permissible within these new legal systems.126 Consequently, “[a]
hierarchy of norms had been created” whereby the rules of customary
law that conflicted with state court decisions were struck down.127
This jurisprudential hierarchy is present in Ghana’s constitu-
tion,128 which states its sources of law as the following: “The laws of
Ghana shall comprise—(a) this Constitution; (b) enactments made
by or under the authority of the Parliament established by this
Constitution; (c) any Orders, Rules and Regulations made by any
120. See Diwan, supra note 4, at 357 (discussing how beliefs in the existence of
witchcraft remain prominent in Africa today).
121. BANDA, supra note 78, at 19.
122. See Davies & Dagbanja, supra note 79, at 305-06 (describing the dual court
system established by the British, whereby courts applying “general law” existed sepa-
rately from local courts, which administered customary law).
123. See id. at 306 (noting that the constitutions of many post-independence
“Anglophonic African countries” have integrated statutes with common law decisions
and customary law).
124. BANDA, supra note 78, at 22,
125. Ocran, supra note 90, at 477. “[T]he African intellectual elite . . . felt insulted by
the notion that their own African laws were somehow repugnant. . . . They wished to
emphasize the fact that these laws represented their own ethos.” Id.
126. Id. at 477.
127. Id. at 478.
128. Id.
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person or authority under a power conferred by this Constitution;
(d) the existing law; and (e) the common law.”129 Chapter Four of
Ghana’s Constitution further clarifies that the common law shall be
comprised of not only the rules of law “generally known as the com-
mon law,” but also of the rules of customary law “applicable to partic-
ular communities in Ghana.”130 In this way, the newly integrated
legal system in Ghana assimilates customary law into its common
law definition. Still, mandate that all parliamentary and judicial
decisions be held as the supreme law of the land, pursuant to their
State constitutions.131
The definition of “traditional leaders” under Chapter 12 of the
South African Constitution similarly recognizes customary law as
a source of South Africa’s domestic law.132 Section 211(3) of this
chapter states that “[t]he courts must apply customary law when that
law is applicable,” though such law is “subject to the Constitution and
any legislation that specifically deals with customary law.”133 As
such, when dealing with the issue of witchcraft in contemporary
sub-Saharan Africa, the question becomes whether the notion of
witchcraft falls under the ‘modern’ legal standard of customary law
as defined by the particular state constitution.134
C. Witchcraft: A Legal Enigma in Sub-Saharan Africa
Like most of the world, sub-Saharan Africa is absorbed in urban-
ization and globalization.135 Therefore, much of its law deals with
“modern legal issues.”136 Still, some concepts used in resolving these
legal issues have roots in the common law. For example, the concept
of “reasonableness,” which is significant in both civil and criminal
matters, has different meanings under common and civil law.137
129. GHANA CONST. ch. 4, arts. 11(1)(a)-(e) (1992); Ocran, supra note 90, at 479.
130. GHANA CONST. ch. 4, arts. 11(2)-(3) (1992).
131. Id. ch. 1, art. 1(2) (1992) This appears to mimic the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution and its role in establishing the hierarchy of law in the American legal
system. The text of the Supremacy Clause reads:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof . . . under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
132. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 12, § 211; Ludsin, supra note 7, at 68.
133. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 12, § 211.
134. Ludsin, supra note 7, at 92.
135. Davies & Dagbanja, supra note 79, at 303-04.
136. Id. at 304.
137. Diwan, supra note 4, at 377.
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Whereas under the common law, the issue of reasonableness asks
whether a defendant has acted in a way that was “[f]air, proper, or
moderate, or proper under the circumstances,”138 in civil law systems,
the question of reasonableness centers upon whether a defendant has
acted with “reasonable care” by exercising “the degree of care that a
prudent and competent person engaged in the same line of business
or endeavor would exercise under similar circumstances.”139
Therefore, in theory, because witchcraft is generally a common-
law offense, a trier-of-fact in a dispute involving the accusation of
witchcraft within sub-Saharan Africa should apply the customary
law’s understanding of reasonableness when deciding the case.140 The
question of what is considered ‘reasonable,’ however, may be an issue
in itself: should the standard of reasonableness be based on modern
beliefs about the legitimacy of witchcraft, on strong traditional com-
munity beliefs, or on a combination of both?141 A related issue is
whether it is reasonable for a court to convict an individual for witch-
craft when there is no observed link between the alleged witchcraft
and the harm suffered.142
Some countries in sub-Saharan Africa continue to enforce and
criminalize accusations of witchcraft or the practice of witchcraft
through reference to legislative acts in place during colonial era.143
For instance, the Witchcraft Suppression Acts in South Africa and
Zimbabwe criminalize accusing another of being a witch.144 On the
other hand, Tanzania’s Witchcraft Ordinance criminalizes all aspects
of witchcraft, including “possess[ing] witchcraft materials.”145
In South Africa and Zimbabwe, accusations of witchcraft often
come to the courts “in the form of ‘imputations’ of witchcraft.”146
Though not referred to as such, the law essentially equates disputes
involving witchcraft accusations against innocent individuals as
138. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
139. Id. at 377-78 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
140. See id. at 378 (“[I]n South Africa and Zimbabwe such imputations [of witchcraft]
are criminal and judges generally seem to apply a reasonableness standard in assessing
injury.”).
141. In South Africa, civil suits involving accusations of witchcraft are adjudicated
within the context of “the customary treatment of witchcraft,” whereas, in criminal cases,
witchcraft beliefs are treated “as wholly unreasonable.” Ludsin, supra note 7, at 91.
142. Id. at 89.
143. Diwan, supra note 4, at 352.
144. Id. at 352-53 (citing Witchcraft Suppression Act No. 3 of 1957, § 1(a) (amended
in 1997) (South Africa); Witchcraft Suppression Act of 1890, § 3 (amended in 2001)
(Zimbabwe)).
145. Id. at 353 (citing Witchcraft Ordinance of 1928, § 4 (Tanzania) (amended in 1956)).
146. Id. at 356. Imputations are “something more than mere naming.” Id. (citation
omitted).
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defamation suits.147 Under the standard for proving wrongful impu-
tation of witchcraft, it must be “clear to the unbiased beholder that
the intention to attribute a certain [witch] characteristic exists in the
mind of the imputor which finds expression in some act or attitude”
of the accused.148 As such, the modern “judicial practice of punishing
individuals who [defame] alleged witches creates a conflict between”
the state legal system and strongly held traditional beliefs.149 Pun-
ishing these acts leads “many people [to] believe ‘that the law is in
collusion with the witches.’ ” 150 Arguably, “ ‘[a] law that fails to take
into account the social ethos of the community . . . remain[s] a dead
letter, incapable of inducing change.’ ”151 Witchcraft law that better
accounts for the beliefs of the general population, then, can perhaps
reconcile the conflict that exists between popular beliefs and state
legal norms.152
In contrast to those laws that criminalize imputing witchcraft
to another, Section 251 of the Cameroon Penal Code criminalizes
actual “witchcraft”:
Whoever commits any act of witchcraft, magic or divination
liable to disturb public order or tranquility, or to harm another
in his person, property or substance, whether by taking a reward
or otherwise, shall be punished with imprisonment for from
two to ten years, and with a fine of five thousand to one hundred
thousand francs.153
Under the Cameroonian system, the question of proof in identi-
fying who is indeed a witch may lie almost conclusively with the
courts.154 By readily accepting at face value evidence from the commu-
nity regarding suspicions and accusations of witchcraft,155 the legal
systems in countries like Cameroon “have chosen to subordinate state
legal norms to norms underlying popular beliefs in local cultures.”156
147. Id. at 356-57 (“Imputations of witchcraft are essentially a type of defamation, and
they are criminalized in many African societies through legislation prohibiting acts of
witchcraft.”).
148. Id. at 356 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
149. Id. at 354.
150. Id. (quoting ONESMUS K. MUTUNGI, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF WITCHCRAFT IN EAST
AFRICA WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO KENYA 59 (1977)).
151. Id. at 353-54 (quoting ONESMUS K. MUTUNGI, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF WITCHCRAFT
IN EAST AFRICA WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO KENYA 104 (1977)).
152. Id. at 354.
153. Diwan, supra note 4, at 353 (citation omitted).
154. “When [a judge] is satisfied that a good case has been established, he will not
hesitate to convict the defendant . . . .” Id. at 368 (internal quotation mark and citation
omitted).
155. Id. (discussing a case in Cameroon where the judge relied on the sole testimony
of a witch doctor to determine the validity of a witchcraft accusation).
156. Id.
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Because African countries handle allegations of witchcraft differ-
ently, it is very difficult for witchcraft trials to always be compatible
with both the rule of law and customary law in the new ‘civilized’
African societies.157 For example, in adjudicating crimes that involve
witch-killing, the common law courts have adopted “the doctrines of
diminished capacity—including insanity, provocation, involuntary
reaction or emotion-induced diminished capacity”158 to deal with
“cultural beliefs they do not share.”159 Additionally, accusations of
witchcraft are often redressed civilly, through defamation lawsuits
or by seeking divorce.160 This disconnect between the newly adopted
“culture” and the customary law renders the system less effective.161
Thus, the current legal systems within sub-Saharan Africa do
not resolve the issues that the belief in witchcraft presents, but rather
create a new host of problems related to witchcraft accusations.162
It is therefore not surprising that, “[w]ithout the support and struc-
ture for handling witchcraft accusations . . . community members
[have] resorted to informal trials”163 and witch-killings,164 a phenom-
enon that has gravely and disproportionately affected women, as
women are those who most often become the victims when witchcraft
is suspected.165
Paradoxically, “the Witchcraft Suppression Act[s have] failed to
meet [their] primary goal of suppressing witchcraft . . . [yet also]
erased what may have been a potentially adequate mechanism for
controlling the manifestations of witchcraft belief .”166 African state
governments have thus failed at both curbing the notion of witch-
craft beliefs and providing sufficient relief for those accused of witch-
craft.167 As victims, women, especially older women, in contemporary
sub-Saharan Africa, have fallen through the cracks of states’ legal
157. Ludsin, supra note 7, at 89.
158. Id. at 91.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Diwan, supra note 4, at 354.
162. Ludsin, supra note 7, at 87-88. For example, many scholars argue that witchcraft
legislation in South Africa undermined the legitimacy of the customary law and the
authoritative role of chiefs within the community, “block[ing] community members’ access
to justice.” Id. at 88. Furthermore, the belief that the laws were “ineffective” caused “people
[to] beg[i]n taking justice against witchcraft into their own hands. Id. at 87.
163. Id. at 88.
164. Hari, supra note 6.
165. Id.
166. Ludsin, supra note 7, at 109.
167. Ironically, “th[is] attempt[ ] by one legal system to suppress another in a legal
dualist society erased what may have been a potentially adequate mechanism for con-
trolling the manifestations of witchcraft belief and replaced it with a less fair, more
dangerous mechanism.” Id.
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systems.168 Thus, the devastating realities that the belief in witchcraft
creates can be reframed as a human rights problem: the discrimina-
tion and marginalization of women within sub-Saharan Africa be-
cause of conflict between customary and state legal systems.169
III. WITCHCRAFT AND HUMAN RIGHTS
A. The Human Rights Question and Sub-Saharan Africa
Inasmuch as “[t]he universality of human rights norms is a cen-
tral tenet in human rights discourse,”170 it is argued “that there can be
no fully universal concept of human rights for it is necessary to take
into account the diverse cultures and political systems of the world.”171
Indeed, each of the more-than fifty countries in Africa is defined by
its own history, unique social, religious and cultural perspective, and
“distinct political econom[y].”172 Therefore, when the discussion turns
to articulating ‘universal’ human rights standards, it is important
to remember that “drawing sweeping conclusions for a continent as
diverse and complex as Africa may be an exercise in futility.”173
In evaluating human rights in the context of sub-Saharan Africa,
the concern of the individual and the protection of her liberty and fun-
damental rights against unwarranted state interferences presents
a different social question.174 Whereas, the “traditional conceptions
of human rights in the African context subsume the interests of the
individual to those of the community,”175 the broader human rights
perspective focuses more on the rights of the individual.176 Under an
African analysis of human rights, “the realization of such rights ex-
tend beyond individual concern and must be expanded to encom-
pass . . . family and community” obligations.177 Therefore, inasmuch
as the rights of the individual are important, the role the individual
168. Hari, supra note 6.
169. See HELPAGE INT’L, supra note 11, at 5 (noting that the underlying causes of
witchcraft accusations “are deeply rooted in cultural beliefs and gender and age based dis-
crimination”). Notably, customary laws and the lack of a clear legal framework perpetuate
human rights violations. Id. at 6.
170. Fareda Banda, Global Standards: Local Values, 17 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 1, 3
(2003).
171. Id. at 4.(quoting ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND HOW WE USE IT 96-97 (1994)).
172. J. Oloka-Onyango, Human Rights and Sustainable Development in Contemporary
Africa: A New Dawn, or Retreating Horizons?, 6 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 39, 40-41 (2000).
173. Id. at 41.
174. Id. at 42.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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plays in her community’s well-being is equally important.178 Thus,
“[t]o say to a[n African] woman that she has entitlements which may
bring her into conflict with the rights of others is to present her with
a seemingly intractable problem.”179
For example, one of the rights of women in many sub-Saharan
African countries, as recognized by many human rights instruments,
is that of equality, which “is based on a notion of sameness with
men—[that] women are to be made or put in the same position as
men.”180 Alongside this notion, however, exists the very unequal
status of African women within the African social structure.181 As
such, it is important to acknowledge that, even with the legal instru-
ments affording protection to women within sub-Saharan Africa,182
“the social, economic and cultural disadvantages suffered by African
women” have resulted in women maintaining a lower social status,
as compared to that of their male African counterparts.183 A woman
in sub-Saharan Africa is therefore viewed under traditional societal
norms as having a status inferior to that of men.184
In spite of the generally-accepted inferior role of women within
sub-Saharan Africa, many have written about the law’s usefulness to
women, and about the human rights protections that exist for women
within the law.185 For instance, under the bill of rights included in
various African state constitutions, there are well-established human
rights standards, which include various rights and protections—often
some specifically ascribed to women—that have been recognized as
human rights throughout the world.186
178. Banda, supra note 170, at 15 (“From an African woman’s perspective, one of the
problems of the whole human rights enterprise is the individualized nature of human
rights. Women in many parts see themselves and are identified as being part of a col-
lective.” (internal citation omitted)).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 8 (citation omitted).
181. Id. Fareda Banda talks about the inferior status of women and “the socio-structural
inequalities of women,” as well as the cultural and economic disadvantages women face.
Id. (citation omitted).
182. See TIYANJANA MALUWA, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN POST-COLONIAL AFRICA 127-28
(1999) (listing the various human rights protected by instruments that have been adopted
by African States such as Malawi and South Africa, including a right of non-discrimination
and to equal spousal rights).
183. Banda, supra note 170, at 8.
184. See Sylvia Tamale, Gender Trauma in Africa: Enhancing Women’s Links to
Resources, 48 J. AFR. L. 50, 55 (2004) (arguing that social structures in Africa function to
“normalize gender inequality” such that “[m]ale domination as the status quo is constantly
defended and protected”).
185. See BANDA, supra note 78, at 13 (discussing the evolution of norms relating to the
human rights of women).
186. MALUWA, supra note 182, at 121, 128.
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Even within this sphere, however, the challenges faced by
African state governments come from various attempts to institute
a democratic rule of law into their political systems and to build “a
political culture founded on a conception of human rights.”187 Thus,
the main puzzle lies in connecting modern-day universal human
rights and democracy issues, with the dynamic and distinct cultural
systems in place sub-Saharan Africa.188 The principle challenge to
solving this puzzle is that the concept of “human rights and democ-
racy in Africa differ because its culture differs.”189 Thus, it is difficult
to apply general, universal human rights principles across the con-
tinent. As a result, in evaluating the human rights question within
sub-Saharan Africa, the answer may lie in tailoring human rights
concepts to fit the realities of sub-Saharan Africa by finding a balance
between the African “collective” and Western “individual” human
rights perspectives.190
B. The Human Rights Answer to the Witchcraft Challenge
In the past, a state’s treatment of its citizens was considered a
domestic affair, not a matter of international law.191 That is not the
case today.192 The field of international human rights has developed
such that states have increasingly come to believe that it is their obli-
gation, and that of the entire international community, to protect the
civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights of all people.193
Consequently, the norms found in international human rights
law can be employed to protect women in sub-Saharan Africa against
human rights violations, like being accused of witchcraft. This may
be achieved by transforming the rationale behind local community
laws and reconciling local laws with regional and international per-
spectives on human rights.194 This is important because, “while human
187. Id. at 122.
188. See id. at 123 (posing the question: “[w]hat is culture, and how does it fit into the
African conception of human rights?”).
189. Id.
190. Ludsin, supra note 7, at 70.
191. MALUWA, supra note 182, at 124-25.
192. Id. at 125.
193. See U.N. Charter arts. 1, 55, 56 (recognizing the international obligations of states
to protect certain universal rights); see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
Res 217 (III) A, publ., U.N. Doc A/RES/217 (III) (Dec. 10, 1945) (“Member States have
pledged themselves to achieve, in cooperation with the United Nations, the promotion of
universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms . . . .”).
Together, these instruments set out same standards of customary international law and
general principles of international human rights law.
194. See Fitnat Naa-Adjeley Adjetey, Reclaiming the African Woman’s Individuality:
The Struggle Between Women’s Reproductive Autonomy and African Society and Culture,
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rights are universal in nature . . . the significance of national and
regional particularities and various historical, cultural, and religious
backgrounds”195 must be accounted for and utilized in order to pro-
tect marginalized women, particularly those victims of witchcraft
accusations, in sub-Saharan Africa. In analyzing this approach, cer-
tain regional and international human rights instruments are crucial,
and will be discussed in later sections.
C. The Local/Regional Perspective on Women’s Rights in Africa
On the domestic level, the rights of women within sub-Saharan
Africa can be protected, first and foremost, through the use of local
laws.196 In some countries, for example, international human rights
norms have been integrated into domestic laws by way of incorpo-
ration into national constitutions.197 For instance, Article 26 of the
Constitution of Ghana, which addresses fundamental human rights
and freedoms, makes clear that “[a]ll customary practices which de-
humanize or are injurious to the physical and mental well-being of
a person are prohibited.”198 Witchcraft accusations and their devas-
tating effect on women, especially older women, would certainly seem
to fall under such domestic protection.199 Another example is the
Republic of Gambia, under whose constitution the general protec-
tion of the rights of women is implemented through a broad scheme
of fundamental rights and freedoms.200 Chapter 28 of the Gambian
Constitution, states that “[w]omen shall be accorded full and equal
dignity of the person with men.” 201 But, as with Ghana, this provision
may be described as only “being on the books”: even with the general
protections supposedly available under the law, women in present-
day Gambian society accused of witchcraft still experience marginali-
zation and discrimination from their communities.202
Hence, despite these supposed constitutional protections, and
even though African countries like Sierra Leone may recognize the
44 AM. U. L. REV. 1351, 1353-54 (1995) (arguing that efforts to address human rights
abuses against women should begin on the local level). “International human rights
norms . . . must be linked to local laws and regional human rights instruments to make
people realize that these norms are not part of an alien culture which is to be imposed on
them.” Id. at 1354.
195. Banda, supra note 170, at 3.
196. Adjetey, supra note 194, at 1353-54.
197. Id. at 1370.
198. GHANA CONST. ch. 5, art. 26(2) (1992).
199. Adinkrah, supra note 1, at 338; Hari, supra note 6.
200. GAMBIA CONST. ch. 4, art. 28(1) (1997).
201. Id.
202. Witchcraft, An Idiom of Power, GAMBIA J. (Apr. 21, 2009), http://www.thegambia
journal.com/Top-News-and-Analyses/298.html.
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importance of additional human rights protections within their local
and state laws, there are still considerable violations against women,
particularly within the arena of witchcraft accusations.203 One could
argue that the lack of domestic resources within poor state govern-
ment systems leads to weak domestic enforcement mechanisms that
fail to implement the law.204
Apart from the economic factors that may affect state govern-
ments’ ability to enforce sanctions for violations of human rights,
generally-accepted cultural practices again play an important part in
the perception and role of women within individual African coun-
tries.205 For example, “[i]n 2002, the Vice-President of Uganda made
public the fact that she had, over a number of years, been subjected
to physical violence by her husband,” a revelation that resulted in a
public outcry against her.206 Even though some viewed the abuse as
wrong (mainly women’s support groups), “[t]he majority of people,
men as well as women” viewed this as a private, “home” incident,
which should have been kept as such.207
This example illustrates how, often, “the ‘privacy’ argument
trump[s] the woman’s right to protection from violence.” 208 Even the
woman’s status as Vice-President did not exempt her from having to
adhere to the generally-accepted gender roles in Uganda, which value
only those wives who are submissive and obedient.209
With “a general cultural expectation that women demonstrate
respect, passivity, obedience, submissiveness, and acquiesce toward
men,” 210 it is therefore not surprising that the general responsiveness
to witchcraft accusations has been underwhelming within patriarchal
African states.211 Even though there are constitutional provisions and
203. Id.; see AMNESTY INT’L, Sierra Leone: Women Face Human Rights Abuses in the
Informal Legal Sector, 7, 19 (2006) [hereinafter Sierra Leone], available at http://www
.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR51/002/2006 (follow “Download: PDF” hyperlink) (asserting
that the Government of Sierra Leone has failed to protect women from human rights
abuses by not enacting legislation to prevent discrimination and, furthermore, by failing
to stop local chiefs from imposing “arbitrary charges against women, such as ‘witchcraft’ ”).
204. Sierra Leone is the world’s poorest country. Thráinn Eggertsson, Response:
Mapping Social Technologies in the Cultural Commons, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 711, 725
n.55 (2010).
205. See BANDA, supra note 78, at 159 (discussing the African “universal wife” concept,
which dictates that “a good wife is one who is obedient and who does not challenge accepted
gender roles”).
206. Id. (citing Tamale, supra note 184, at 55).
207. Id.; see also Tamale, supra note 184, at 55 (noting that many Ugandans believe that
these home “issues do not belong in the public arena”).
208. BANDA, supra note 78, at 159.
209. Id.
210. Adinkrah, supra note 1, at 331.
211. E.g., Sierra Leone, supra note 203, at 7 & n.14 (“It is unlawful for Chiefs to adju-
dicate on cases of witchcraft. There is no crime of ‘witchcraft’ in Sierra Leonean law, and
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laws for the protection of women, they clearly are not being utilized.212
Yet aggressive efforts at the domestic level through enforcement mech-
anisms by state governments and civic groups may still be the best
answer for protecting women against accusations of witchcraft.213
In addition, the use of regional efforts to achieve the common goal
of the protection of all African women from the ramifications of a cus-
tomary belief in witchcraft may be another crucial tool.214 Especially
“[w]here local laws do not permit the pursuits of women’s rights . . .
regional human rights instrument[s]” can be effective in bridging the
gap between local laws and international human rights norms.215
The African Charter216 encompasses this regional approach by rec-
ognizing the culture of Africa within—and incorporating this culture
into—its conception of human rights.217 The Charter also contains the
recently enacted 2003 Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa (the
Protocol),218 designed specifically to protect African women from “all
forms of discrimination,” 219 including those “particular to Africa.” 220
Article 2 of the Protocol, for example, requires that “State Parties . . .
combat all forms of discrimination against women through appropriate
legislative, institutional and other measures,” 221 including through an
“integrat[ion of] a gender perspective in[to] their policy decisions, legis-
lation, development plans, programmes and activities.” 222 Article 17
of the Protocol also states that “[w]omen shall have the right to live
thus any such charge is arbitrary and violates international human rights standards.”).
Neither has the rest of the world taken note of the human rights violations perpetrated
against women accused of being witches: “[a]cross Africa, a war is being waged on women—
but we are refusing to hear the screams. . . . For decades, we have not wanted to know,
because it sounded too much like the old colonialist claims of African ‘primitivism . . . .’ ”
Hari, supra note 6.
212. See supra note 150 and accompanying text (juxtaposing the protections in the
Gambian Constitution with the witch hunt instituted by the country’s own President).
213. See Adjetey, supra note 194, at 1353, 1372 (describing how concentrating efforts
locally will better achieve human rights protections for women).
214. See id. at 1369 (suggesting that African NGOs join together to “devise a plan of
action,” because “[w]idespread education on human rights is . . . essential to alter peoples’
way of thinking.”).
215. Id. at 1373.
216. African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, 1520
U.N.T.S. 217.
217. Adjetey, supra note 194, at 1374.
218. Protocol to the African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights on the
Rights of Women in Africa, Sept. 13, 2000, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/66.6(2003) [hereinafter
The Protocol].
219. Id. art. 2(1).
220. Kristin Davis, Note, The Emperor is Still Naked: Why the Protocol on the Rights
of Women in Africa Leaves Women Exposed to More Discrimination, 42 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 949, 952 (2009) (citation omitted).
221. The Protocol, supra note 218, art. 2(1).
222. Id. art. 2(1)(c).
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in a positive cultural” environment,223 and requires “States Parties
[to] take all appropriate measures to enhance the participation of
women in the formulation of cultural policies at all levels.” 224
The Protocol also requires States to implement legislation to curb
“harmful practices” that jeopardize women’s health and safety.225 De-
fined under Article 1 of the Protocol, “ ‘[h]armful [p]ractices’ means
all behaviour, attitudes and/or practices which negatively affect the
fundamental rights of women and girls, such as their right to life,
health, dignity, education and physical integrity.” 226 One may natu-
rally conclude from this language that the accusation of witchcraft
constitutes a “harmful practice” against women, and thus is very
much renounced by the Protocol.
Furthermore, because the Protocol incorporates “both civil and
political[,] and socio-economic and cultural rights”227 it is more com-
prehensive than any pre-existing instrument dealing with the rights
of African women, and so is regarded as the best.228 Indeed, “the
Protocol is the first international human rights instrument to affirm
a woman’s right to seek an abortion.” 229 Thus, such a right theoreti-
cally exists in contemporary African society. Notably, the Protocol
also addresses issues such as the impact of armed conflicts on the
lives of African women.230 This and other provisions are designed to
specifically address and provide protection against the particular
abuses suffered by African women. Hence, because accusations of
witchcraft mostly victimize elderly widows in sub-Saharan Africa,231
protections against these accusations should be recognized and guar-
anteed under the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa.
Yet the extent to which the African Charter and its Protocol can
protect women within sub-Saharan Africa against allegations of witch-
craft is debatable. One of the criticisms levied against the Protocol is
223. Id. art. 17(1).
224. Id. art. 17(2).
225. Id. art. 2(1).
226. Id. art 1.
227. BANDA, supra note 78, at 79.
228. Davis, supra note 220, at 952 (noting that the Protocol is lauded as being “the most
progressive tool for protecting women’s rights to date” (citing Anne Gathumbi, Making
Reproductive Health Rights a Reality, PAMBAZUKA NEWS, Jan 20, 2005, http://www
.pambazuka.prg/en/category/features/26455)).
229. Id. at 962. Article 14 of the Protocol on health and reproductive rights affirms
women’s “right to control their fertility.” The Protocol, supra note 218, art. 14(1).
230. The Protocol, supra note 218, art. 11. The Protocol also grants “Widows’ Rights,” id.
art. 20, and recognizes the need for “Special Protection of Elderly Women.” Id. art. 22. Both
of these provisions may aid in the protection of women from accusations of witchcraft in
sub-Saharan Africa.
231. Hari, supra note 6.
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that its provisions are unobtainable, despite being “legally binding”
on all African countries.232 For instance, although “Article 26 of the
Protocol calls upon States Parties to ensure the implementation of ”
its provisions into domestic law,233 this requirement is arguably be-
yond the reach of the Protocol because it fails to take into account the
differences within each country’s legal system,234 be they political,
or socio-economic. Further, the Protocol’s not allowing state parties
to deviate from its conventions has resulted in a reality where state
parties with different political and socio-economic standards refuse
to be bound by the same human rights rules.235
Another excuse invoked by states not following the Protocol is
“that the people who ratify human rights instruments tend to be the
political élite in a country and may not necessarily be representing
the position of all in that country.” 236 These problems undermine the
Protocol’s effectiveness because, over time, permitting states to ig-
nore obligations “create[s] evidence of an acceptable customary in-
ternational norm or state practice that ultimately makes such illegal
behavior legally acceptable.” 237 As a result, within a society like
Cameroon, where witchcraft is punishable as a crime,238 the Protocol
may be deemed entirely ineffective. In other countries, such as South
Africa and Kenya, where the belief in witchcraft is rampant even
among the educated,239 it is not surprising that community vigilante
justice is still utilized to eradicate alleged witches or witchcraft, de-
spite the existing forms of human rights protections, be they domestic,
or regional, like the Protocol.240
The Protocol is further criticized for its heavy reliance on various
United Nations treaties like the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Declara-
tion on the Elimination of Violence against Women.241 This reliance
has led commentators to describe the Protocol as “uncompromisingly
232. Davis, supra note 220, at 952.
233. Id. at 966 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
234. Id. at 966-67 (noting how the Protocol contains much “overarching vagueness,” and
arguing that more guidance is needed in light of “the fact that States Parties [sic] legal
systems are as diverse as the continent itself”).
235. See id. at 965 (observing how some “African countries have wholly ignored” pro-
visions of the Protocol that “interfere with customary practices,” such as common-law
marriage (citation omitted)).
236. Banda, supra note 170, at 5 (citation omitted).
237. Davis, supra note 220, at 953.
238. Diwan, supra note 4, at 353.
239. LeVine, supra note 5, at 229.
240. Ludsin, supra note 7, at 88-89.
241. Banda, supra note 170, at 18. CEDAW will be discussed in greater detail in the
following section.
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pro-woman and anti-defence of discriminatory cultural practices,” 242
and as “mak[ing] far-reaching demands” that are impractical and in-
applicable as applied to certain customary African traditions.243 For
example, under Article 6, which governs marriage, “monogamy is en-
couraged as the preferred form of marriage.” 244 Yet “[m]ost legal sys-
tems on the continent recognize polygamy, either as a customary or
religious ‘right.’ ” 245 The Protocol thus creates a system of law that
alienates the actual culture within African society. This consequently
undermines the positive effects such a provision can have for women
by triggering non-enforcement from individual state actors.246
Dealing with witchcraft allegations may therefore be described
as a situation in which States parties know of their human rights
obligations, but, because of unique domestic/cultural circumstances,
their “excuses” for not following these obligations are readily accepted
without the states having to suffer any consequences. Therefore, even
though the Protocol is praised as having adopted practical protections
for women within sub-Saharan Africa,247 it actually may not be an
effective tool for protecting of women from charges of witchcraft be-
cause of problems relating to the implementation and enforcement
of its provisions.248
D. The International Perspective on Women’s Rights
For the reasons just discussed, international norms and other
mechanisms, such as treaties, may be the tool necessary to protect
women from the stigma—and danger—of being labeled a witch in
sub-Saharan Africa. One of these treaties is CEDAW.249 Adopted by
the United Nations General Assembly in 1979, CEDAW protects
women against all forms of prejudice by guaranteeing the equality
of women within all sectors. These protections extend to all “political,
economic, social, cultural [and] civil” rights.250 Often referred to as
242. Id.
243. See id. (listing several provisions that fail to take into account customary African
beliefs and practices).
244. The Protocol, supra note 218, art. 6.
245. Banda, supra note 170, at 18.
246. See id. at 18-19 (arguing that these culturally-insensitive provisions undermine
support for the instrument, and that without support from “ordinary people,” the Protocol
is “likely to be yet another paper tiger”).
247. Davis, supra note 220, at 951-52.
248. See id. at 974 (describing how some countries’ constitutions elevate customary
views of gender and discrimination over contemporary views, such as those found in the
Protocol).
249. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
250. Id. art. 1.
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a “bill of rights for women,” 251 CEDAW defines “discrimination” as
“any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex
which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recog-
nition, enjoyment or exercise by women . . . on a basis of equality of
men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms.” 252
Under this definition of discrimination, CEDAW makes irrelevant the
issues of whether an act was committed “by a state actor or a private
individual or private organisation” and whether the discrimination
was direct or indirect.253
With a goal of promoting equality and preventing the margin-
alization of women, CEDAW’s preamble and sixteen “substantive
articles” make it a comprehensive legal instrument.254 State govern-
ments, “that have ratified or acceded to the Convention are legally
bound to put its provisions into practice.” 255
CEDAW in not the only option. Because sub-Saharan women
accused of witchcraft face being subjected to violent acts and other
forms of victimization,256 the protections of the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CAT)257 can also be invoked because it protects against
“cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.258 Under
Article 2, CAT calls for each state party to “take effective legislative,
administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture
in any territory under its jurisdiction,” 259 and may implement com-
parable domestic laws and regional mechanisms to comply with fun-
damental human rights under CAT.260 The role of state parties in
sub-Saharan Africa is thus to use their domestic legislation to prevent
and provide redress for such violations of CAT, including violence
committed against women accused of witchcraft.
251. Press Release, Women’s Anti-Discrimination Committee Holds 27th Session in
New York, 3-21 June: Will Review Reports of Eight State Parties, U.N. Doc. WOM/1337
(May 30, 2002) [hereinafter U.N. Press Release], available at http://www.un.org/News/
Press/docs/2002/WOM1337.doc.htm.
252. CEDAW, supra note 249, art. 1.
253. BANDA, supra note 78, at 59.
254. U.N. Press Release, supra note 251.
255. Id.
256. See Hari, supra note 6 (stating that witch beatings and killings happen almost
daily in parts of Africa such as Sukumuland, Tanzania).
257. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
258. See id. pmbl.
259. Id., art. 2(1).
260. See Ronald L. Nelson, Torture in the Law of the Fifty American States: Searching
for Definition, 4 WAR CRIMES, GENOCIDE & CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 1, 8 (2010) (noting
that the United States, which is a signatory to CAT, has federal legislation implementing
CAT’s terms into the domestic law, which CAT requires signatory States to do).
502 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 17:475
Because CEDAW and CAT are binding legal instruments, “States
are responsible for bringing their domestic law and practice into con-
formity with their obligations under international law to protect and
promote human rights.” 261 Yet the reality is that states often elevate
their own interests over this obligation.262 This is essentially one of
the main criticisms of international mechanisms like CEDAW and
CAT. For example, even when a state has ratified a treaty, imple-
menting legislation may be necessary for the treaty obligations to
take legal effect, “[y]et many states that ratify human rights treaties
do not enact all of the necessary implementing legislation.” 263 As a
result, treaties like CEDAW, “which specifically aimed to protect
women from discrimination [have] failed to meet the needs of women
in the African context.” 264
Another criticism of international mechanisms is that, unlike the
Protocol, the general approach to addressing fundamental issues af-
fecting women’s rights worldwide, an approach reflected by CEDAW,
often does not take into account the issues raised by specific customs,
practices, and traditions. This means that culturally unique and sensi-
tive issues, like the allegations of witchcraft common in sub-Saharan
Africa, are addressed only generally.265 In addition, “it is not uncom-
mon for states to formally commit to human rights agreements, but
fail to change their practices to conform to the treaty requirements.”266
Furthermore, “[a]chieving domestic enforcement requires that
state parties have the legal and structural capacity to create and en-
force legal rights and obligations,” 267 which may not be the case in
sub-Saharan Africa. Lastly, because only the elite play an important
role in implementing international agreements within African soci-
eties,268 the inhabitants of these states, who comprise mostly rural
populations and informally educated communities,269 may not accept
261. Adjetey, supra note 194, at 1370 (citation omitted).
262. See Anthony D’Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 1110, 1113 (1982) (discussing how it might not be in the “collection of
interests” for a “hypothetical new nation . . . to accept any of the[ ] [rules of international
law] as obligatory upon itself”).
263. Angela M. Banks, CEDAW, Compliance, and Custom: Human Rights Enforcement
in Sub-Saharan Africa, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 781, 790 (2009) (citation omitted).
264. Davis, supra note 220, at 958 (citation omitted).
265. E.g., CEDAW, supra note 249, art. 2. CEDAW simply requires States “[t]o take all
appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations,
customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women.” Id.
266. Banks, supra note 263, at 785 (citation omitted).
267. Id. at 791.
268. Banda, supra note 170, at 5 (citation omitted).
269. Davis, supra note 220, at 988 (noting that “rural and informally educated commu-
nities” have been excluded from the dialogue of human rights law).
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or understand the “legitimacy of the international legal obligations
and norms” because they have not been socially internalized.270
Accordingly, the lack of enforcement mechanisms, practical
domestic laws, and ratification standards in sub-Saharan commu-
nities means that the harm resulting from allegations of witchcraft
made against women in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa cannot
easily be alleviated by local, regional or international human rights
mechanisms. Furthermore, the dilemma presented by choice of law
and conflicts within the law, namely the “conflict between state legal
norms and norms underlying popular beliefs in witchcraft,” reduces
any effectiveness that laws meant to punish individuals who kill
accused witches may have.271 As a result, women in sub-Saharan
Africa have fallen through the cracks present in human rights and
domestic legal instruments.
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
The notion of witchcraft and its effect on women’s human rights
is a problem unique to contemporary Africa, and, as such, it will need
a contemporary “African” solution. Even with the modern domestic,
regional, and international legal protections available to women in
sub-Saharan Africa who are victims of human rights abuses, such as
those suffered as a result of being accused of witchcraft, the systems
for providing protection and redress are still riddled with conflict.272
The principle conflict is that which lies between existing beliefs in
witchcraft and modern practical standards punishing those who act
violently when witchcraft is suspected. Fortunately, several possible
solutions do exist.273
According to Professor K.O. Adinkrah,274 a professor of law at the
University of Ghana, the general protections within sub-Saharan
Africa against witchcraft accusations can be described as “legally
protected on paper, but unprotected in reality.” 275 This may be the
number one problem facing the eradication of the belief in witchcraft
within sub-Saharan Africa. For example, under the Ghana Constitu-
tion, as with other constitutions in Africa, there are legal protections
270. Banks, supra note 263, at 799.
271. Diwan, supra note 4, at 354.
272. Id.
273. Id. (“If the law is more responsive to popular needs to regulate witchcraft, and if
it provides a comprehensive way of addressing these needs in a manner accessible to the
general population, perhaps the conflict between popular and state legal norms would
be reconciled.”).
274. Dr. K.O. Adinkrah, LLB (Hons), LLM (Ghana) & JSD (Berkeley), is a renowned
legal scholar specializing in family law at the Ghana School of Law. He is also a practicing
Barrister and Solicitor.
275. Interview with Dr. K.O. Adinkrah, Professor of Law, Ghana School of Law, Accra,
Ghana (Jan. 8, 2010) [hereinafter Adinkrah Interview].
504 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 17:475
against acts that constitute “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment.” 276 Victims of witchcraft accusations may bring claims
under criminal law that they have suffered a form of degrading treat-
ment or cruel punishment, and/or perhaps invoke defamation and
slander suits as a means to protect against witchcraft accusations.277
The issue, however, is whether such suits actually get to court.278
Unless an individual accused of being a witch is already being tried
criminally, it is less likely that she will seek relief through the court
system, if indeed such relief is available.279 Hence, even though there
may exist the necessary means of relief within African court systems
for individuals prosecuted for outdated crimes like witchcraft, such
injustices are rarely redressed through the court systems.280
To find a solution for this dilemma, African governments must
first recognize that a problem exists within their legal systems. They
must then address the need for more integration between custom-
ary and state legal systems, specifically in the context of witchcraft
accusations and violence against suspected witches.281 For example,
instead of adopting Witchcraft Suppression Acts, states could adopt
legislation that attempts to control witchcraft. By accepting that the
belief in witchcraft in fact exists, but acknowledging that the “law
can control it,” 282 the State thus harmonizes the customary and state
legal systems.
As accusations of witchcraft certainly can have serious conse-
quences,283 the law and the courts of sub-Saharan Africa should also
discourage “false” claims.284 One way to accomplish this may be to
modify the objective standard of “reasonable” within the court sys-
tems to include a traditional community norm standard of reasonable-
ness for evaluating cases.285 In addition, states could create special
witchcraft courts to handle all aspects of witchcraft accusations, in-
cluding punishments and fines for false and self-serving accusations.286
In this way, sub-Saharan African states can recognize the interests
276. GHANA CONST. ch. 5, art. 15(1)(a) (1992); see also S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 2(12)(1)(e)
(“Everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person, which includes the right . . .
not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way.”).
277. Adinkrah Interview, supra note 275.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Ludsin, supra note 7, at 102.
282. Id. at 103. This is especially true because “the witchcraft belief is not the problem,
but the actions taken on those beliefs.” Id. at 102.
283. See Diwan, supra note 4, at 381 (noting that imputations of witchcraft can risk
harm to those accused and often cause problems in the community).
284. Id.
285. Id. In some communities, laws that guard against “imputation[s] of witchcraft are
contrary to some traditional community norms of what is seen as reasonable conduct.” Id.
286. Ludsin, supra note 7, at 104.
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of the people in preserving customary traditions, yet still curb the
risks associated with witchcraft accusations.
On the other hand, some may say that there are enough legisla-
tive and criminal protections against the harms associated with the
notion of witchcraft, and that governments should instead focus more
on the efficacy of domestic enforcement mechanisms within the con-
tinent.287 Whether the focus is on prevention or enforcement, the
criminal justice systems within sub-Saharan countries must take
more proactive steps to stop such abuses, particularly in light of the
fact that witchcraft accusations can result in serious injuries, and
even death, to the innocent woman accused.288
In the prevention of such crimes, direct and serious actions must
be taken against those who kill individuals accused of witchcraft, as
well as enforced. For example, the imposition of minimum sentenc-
ing standards will be introduced throughout the continent through
public service announcements and campaigns. The witchcraft issue
would thus be thrust to the forefront, and all would know that acts
taken against accused witches are crimes for which there are serious
repercussions in all African communities.289
Additionally, in part because of the social circumstances within
sub-Saharan African society and the lack of education for women and
girls,290 women in Africa are generally not very assertive, and they are
less likely to invoke the legal protections of customary law or state
legal systems, even if doing so could legally protect them from victimi-
zation.291 Yet because the belief in witchcraft functions to margin-
alize women,292 education of girls and women must be encouraged.
Indeed, “[e]ducation is one of the most important means of empower-
ing women with the knowledge, skills, and self confidence necessary
to participate fully in a development process” 293 in sub-Saharan
Africa, and thus should be a particularly important focus.
African governments and local leaders should also educate their
communities with respect to the fallacy of witchcraft accusations and
287. Banks, supra note 263, at 782 (arguing that domestic enforcement mechanisms
are “one of the most effective means of enforcing” human rights obligations). “Recognizing
the value of domestic enforcement,” the CEDAW Committee urges states to “strengthen
domestic enforcement mechanisms” in order to fully realize human rights protections.
Id. at 782-83 (citation omitted).
288. Ludsin, supra note 7, at 63 (noting that thousands of innocent individuals have
been killed as a result of witchcraft accusations).
289. But cf. Tebbe, supra note 14, at 217-18 (discussing how Africans who believe witch-
craft is real feel wronged by the State punishing those who accuse others of witchcraft).
290. Sharon LaFraniere, Another School Barrier for African Girls: No Toilet, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 23, 2005, at A1 (emphasizing that “poverty, tradition, and ignorance” have deprived
24 million African girls of an education).
291. Adinkrah Interview, supra note 275.
292. Adinkrah, supra note 1, at 338.
293. Adjetey, supra note 194, at 1378.
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the harmful effects such accusations have on women.294 Aggressive
television and newspaper public service campaigns broadcast and
written in every local language should be encouraged.295 Governments,
community grassroots efforts, and nonprofit organizations should set
aside public service and educational resources to find ways to en-
courage women to “step out of their prescribed social roles” 296 and
feel confident enough to assert their rights.297
Professor Adinkrah also suggests that competing interests
and demands in contemporary African societies may be blamed for
today’s problem of the victimization of women suspected of witch-
craft.298 He has suggested that perhaps society should simply allow
such practices to go on until the attitudes of the people change, espe-
cially as the continent lacks the necessary resources to promote effec-
tive change.299 This view is reflective of the “cultural purist approach,”
which “favour[s] . . . the retention of the status quo.” 300 Following
this approach, issues like the victimization of women accused of witch-
craft would remain subject to customary law systems, rather than
state legal systems, thereby maintaining the status quo.301
But one must wonder whether, and at what time, society will
change, as women suspected of witchcraft have long been victimized
despite the various legal protections that have become available in
domestic, regional, and international systems. Hence “[to] argue for
things to remain as they are is both unrealistic and unhelpful” 302 in
saving this class of victimized women. Accusations of witchcraft and
their implications certainly remain a contemporary problem faced
by women in sub-Saharan Africa. This problem needs immediate,
domestic solutions.
CONCLUSION
Like the unfortunate old women in Kumbungu, Ghana who were
bludgeoned and stoned to death for “bewitchment” of a young man,303
the notion of witchcraft and the consequent vigilante justice it inspires
against women still exists in modern-day sub-Saharan Africa.304 In
294. Adinkrah, supra note 1, at 349.
295. Id. at 349.
296. Davis, supra note 220, at 992 (citation omitted).
297. Adjetey, supra note 194, at 1378. The author talks about the frustration she has felt
in trying to convince illiterate women in Ghana to understand and believe they have rights.
298. Adinkrah Interview, supra note 275.
299. Id.
300. Banda, supra note 170, at 14.
301. Id. This approach was utilized by South African chiefs to resist the application of
anti-discrimination principles to customary law. Id.
302. Id.
303. Adinkrah, supra note 1, at 343.
304. Hari, supra note 6; Ludsin, supra note 7, at 88.
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spite of the various protections available in domestic, regional, and
international human rights instruments, women in contemporary
sub-Saharan Africa still face considerable discrimination pursuant
to the notion of witchcraft and fall between the cracks present in
these legal instruments.
Part of the problem may be based on the existence of fairly com-
plex “integrated” legal systems within contemporary sub-Saharan
Africa.305 Where common law and civil law traditions are infused
with modern customary/traditional interpretations, the result is a
conflict of laws between state protections against allegations of witch-
craft and customary laws that preserve the belief in witchcraft.306 In
addition, even though the states purport to denounce the belief in
witchcraft that still holds fast in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa,
there generally are few civil or criminal actions, and few enforce-
ment mechanisms for such actions, to protect women,307 despite the
fact that vigilante justice is often employed to “take care” of witch-
craft’s presumed harm. This has lead to grave human rights violations
against women, particularly older women, in contemporary sub-
Saharan Africa.
It is therefore suggested that a local/domestic solution is the best
method for solving the unique problems associated with the belief in
witchcraft. Through individualized, state-specific protective standards
that seek to harmonize state legal systems and customary/traditional
laws in African communities, the victimization and marginalization
of women within sub-Saharan African societies can be stopped. With
the right implementation standards, the law can finally protect women
in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa from the harms suffered follow-
ing an allegation of witchcraft.
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